Sunday, February 14, 2010

Political Efficacy in America: Major Variables and What it is

Efficacy In America:

An Examination of the Major Variables that Comprise Political Efficacy

POSI 4399 Fall 2009


Political efficacy is generally said to gauge a citizen’s trust in the governmental system. In a democracy, it is used to measure the belief that the individual holds some sway over its elected officials. There are two different and unique types of efficacy which comprise political efficacy: Internal and external. In an essay prepared by three political scientists at the University of Michigan, internal efficacy is defined as “The sense of personal competence in and comprehension of politics;” and external efficacy “Is the belief that the system is responsive to the individual.” 2 Moreover, they assert that “Internal efficacy boosts participation by facilitating anger, but not fear … [and] external efficacy, because it is not self-referential, is not linked to participation via this emotional process.”2 So why is efficacy important, and what issues can manipulate efficacy intensity?

Political efficacy is important because it is the main factor in whether or not a person shows up to the polls on voting day. Furthermore, it is widely known that those who actively participate in the democratic process (persons who exhibit high levels of political efficacy,) are the most likely group of Americans to vote in any election. Thus a thorough examination of the reasons behind said involvement is necessary. I will unveil the mystery behind this subject by exposing the factors that contribute to high and low feelings of political efficacy. Reasoning with length and scope, this paper will address only the major components of efficacy, by excluding the many “fringe” factors that only marginally affect efficacy, and limiting discussion on the long-term effects of such attributes by not addressing critiques to any of the studies used.

First, what causes high feelings of political efficacy? Essentially, if one believes that they can create change within the established government, they are said to have high feelings of political efficacy. Many factors can contribute to this feeling. Among them are personal and familial social standing, race, creed, living environment, and education. Most importantly however, is how the electorate view their connection to government.

One way voters will shape their political ideas of a candidate or party is through a relative association of personal social status. In this study by Abramowitz, Lanoue, and Ramesh, voter opinions are shown to be formed around the supposed economic state of the union. Using data from the 1984 American National Election Study (NES), they discover that “Evaluations of the presidential candidates were affected by perceived changes in personal economic well-being only among citizens who were, in turn, related to the direction of change in financial well-being and to political interest – those citizens whose economic well-being had declined, and those who followed the campaign closely were more likely to attribute responsibility to the government (or society) than those whose circumstances had improved, and those who paid less attention to the campaign … The key variable affecting political evaluations seems to be the location of responsibility for changes in economic well-being.”1

Essentially, it comes down to blame. Those that charge the government for a personal lack, or loss of wealth, will hold elected officials accountable by negatively judging the current party. Interestingly, those same individuals, in the event of an upturn in their pocketbooks, credit only themselves. Thus, opinion of government is harmed by a bad economy, is minimally rewarded for a good one, and is unaffected by another portion of voters who fail to see a connection between their personal finances and the national policies.1

Voters may also form partisan ideas based on which party is currently in power, and which one(s) are not holding positions. Ronald Lambert and others conducted a study of this very notion. Their “Working hypothesis is that people will feel government is more responsive and trustworthy when what they define as their party is in power [(regardless of political affiliation)] … The clearest evidence for this hypothesis has come from Citrin’s analysis of trust in American post-election surveys … Democrats trusted government less when there was a Republican president … and so did Republicans when there was a Democratic president.”3

This phenomenon seemingly occurs out of a primitive fear of being excluded. The rationale behind such action indicates that members of the opposing party do not feel comfortable supporting the organization that is not in power. Regardless of initial affiliation, once a president has been selected, it is believed that representation will only be successfully gained from the incoming or incumbent movement. Lambert has found that “People who identify with a governing party, in short, will be more likely to believe that the government is sympathetic to their wishes and serves their interests.” Unbelievably, the party in power even garners a higher leniency from its electorate, because “They will express a proprietary interest in their party’s welfare, and … Therefore, be inclined to think kindly of its performance in government.”3

The scandals surrounding a previous regime can be very difficult to overcome for potential newcomers of the same party. For example, Martin Wattenberg attributes Al Gore’s 2000 campaign loss to outgoing President Bill Clinton’s highly publicized affair with Monica Lewinsky. He even compares Clinton/Gore to Truman/Stevenson in 1952, and Johnson/Humphrey in 1968 – all of those former Vice Presidents were shown by NES to be overshadowed by their former colleagues’ reputations.38 Wattenberg’s data shows that “One out of five independents [said] they disliked Gore because of Clinton and only one out of fifty [said] that Clinton was a positive factor.”39 In addition, Clinton’s exceptionally high job approval ratings, but extremely low personal approval ratings (70% said that “dishonest” described Clinton well), attest to the fact that this one, poor, ethical decision was enough to significantly damage the reputation of the Democratic party and cause voters to lose trust (an integral part of political efficacy which I will explore later).38

It wasn’t until 2004 that the full effects of the Democratic loss in 2000 were felt. Kenneth Winneg and Kathleen Jamieson found that high-level variances in the 2000 Presidential campaign had leveled off in 2004, and that Republicans were coming out ahead. Not only had they made significant gains in the South, but also with Independents, and traditional Democratic territories such as Maine, Oregon, and with women. In fact, the 2004 Presidential election marked the first time since 1976 exit polling that voting Republicans equaled the same number as voting Democrats, a group that usually holds a 60/40 aggregate balance in their favor.40 I believe that this trend would have continued well in to the future, had it not been for George W. Bush’s massive political shortcomings, which led to the collapse of an amalgamated GOP, and set the stage for the currently united Democrat House and Presidency.

Robert Heilbroner noted that in a market society (such as Capitalist America,) political power tends to follow wealth.11 Beyond any reasonable doubt, this is true. Our entire governmental system was centered around gaining capital and maintaining affluence! So is it truly any wonder that the only consistent “hot-button” issue is taxes? Or that the social welfare of our nation is referred to as a burden? Or that the top 1% of Americans hold the majority of our country’s wealth?

In this land, money can mean power, respect, and undue influence over others – including politicians. Form and Huber note that “People in different social and economic strata are also in different political strata,” as are “People in different racial and income strata, especially those at the top and bottom. [They] tend to develop different political ideologies.”9 The upper and lower classes may follow the same set of laws, but they are affected by them in distinctly different ways.

Form and Huber found that “Studies consistently report substantial differences in voting rates when income, education, occupation, and race are used as independent variables.”10 The differences that they report are basically, the higher your income, level of education, and rank in the workplace, the more politically efficacious you feel. None of this is surprising because all those variables are strongly interrelated, with the exception of race. Minorities can be characterized by low scores in the aforementioned arenas, but not defined by them. The difference that is classically overlooked is how strong of an influence income is on occupation, education, and efficacy.

Most of the minorities in this country are recent immigrants (first and second generation,) and have not yet had the time and resources required to define themselves as a functioning political entity. When entering into a new country, one typically starts at the bottom of the corporate ladder, which explains their general occupation level. Furthermore, because public schools are paid for largely through property taxes, immigrants that necessarily move into poorer districts will be forced to send their children to the low-budget schools.

It is a well supported fact that standardized test scores are their lowest in such areas. This indicates that either the quality of a handful of teachers at these schools is below average, or all the students who are attending similar schools are below average intelligence. Pragmatically, it must be the former because there is simply no way that thousands of young students across America are simply born dumber than other children in different school groups. Also, since success in primary and secondary school provide the greatest single-variable measurement of likelihood to attend college, and this higher level of education is present in almost all members of the upper class,8 it has become justifiable to say that income and education are directly related to each other (not to mention the inherent monetary costs that college require).

Additionally, knowledge regarding how the government operates, and accordingly, how to manipulate it, is gained in the process of acquiring a college education. This explains why nine-tenths of the rich in Form and Huber’s data said that they have been voting ever since they were of age.8 For that reason, the interests of the wealthy are seldom ignored. Consistent voting blocs, such as the elderly and the rich, have obtained clout because politicians have realized that if they appeal to these steady groups, it is relatively easy to garner their votes. Thus what appeared at first to be a spontaneously appeased group of citizens, have turned out to be nothing shadier than followers of democracy deriving their just power from representation.

So then, if political power has in fact been gained legitimately by those of privileged circumstance, why do others still believe that the rich are capable of exerting more political authority than the poor? Form and Huber’s data showed that “Three-fifths of persons in all strata indicated that lobbies have great influence on the law-making process.” Then when asked which groups held the most sway over politicians in Washington, “Half of the respondents chose ‘big businessmen and rich’… [followed by] labor unions.… Only among the rich did a majority believe that unions had the greatest influence.”13

Various Political Action Committees (PAC) and privately owned companies have indeed been caught offering bribes to Congressmen in exchange for beneficial legislation passing. Such organizations even openly give millions of dollars worth in the form of goods, services, and campaign contributions to our legislators. How effective this truly is proves irrelevant to its impression of control over the government. Form and Huber have shown that feelings of internal and external efficacy are high in the upper class because they believe that donating to PACs is working, and it has allowed them to mentally take on the role as a “force to be reckoned with.”8

Reversely, minorities, lower and working classes, and the uneducated, also believe that the PACs, controlled by the rich, are working. This has caused their external efficacy to decrease because they see the system as only responsive to the big-time spenders that believe they have more control because their organizations are a certain size. Their internal efficacy also decreases because they have not received the proper education to make them feel competent in their own abilities to understand and participate in politics. Also, because they believe that big business and the rich control politics, they see their situation as a direct result of actions taken by the government and the elite, as opposed to a product of their own creation. Overall, it gives them the impression that the rich are getting richer, and the poor are getting poorer, and there is nothing they can do.8

In addition to income, and the perceived influence that it can buy, another way that voters form opinions of their representatives can be attributed to the area’s specific political culture. Daniel Elazar defines political culture as “A framework of values which establishes cultural limits on individual and group behavior, thereby shaping the overall tone or style of political activity in a society.”4 Political culture can vary so widely that it is impossible to confine any one culture to a specific area for an extended period of time. What is permanent however, is the effect on political efficacy. Elazar “Suggests that the relationship is mediated by subjective feelings of political efficacy, and by the degree of interparty competition.”5 Or, in Russell Hanson’s words, “Different political cultures produce different patterns of political efficacy and different levels of interparty competition.”6

Elazar’s judgments on political culture clearly demonstrate a proverbial “Mobius strip,” in which the effects of an action become the future effects of the next action – and continue to influence each other in such a way that the root and result become interdependent. Hanson notes that “Turnout is higher in moralistic subcultures because those subcultures produce stronger feelings of political efficacy … [and] Turnout is lower in traditionalistic subcultures because those subcultures produce weaker feelings of political efficacy…”6 The following graphic provides a visual representation of the relationship.

Reference Note 7

As noted in the diagram, education has been consistently named one of most important determining factors in a person’s private feelings of efficacy. Form and Huber’s research shows a connection between higher education and increased voting rates, as well as lower (or no) education and smaller turnout rates. The outcome appears to stem specifically from the individual’s original notion of how the government functions, and the extent to which (they believe) the government plays a role in their day-to-day lives.8

Typically, those that are afforded a higher education possess more knowledge on how the government operates, realize the importance of voting, and accordingly, will march to the polls on Election Day. That same class of educated voters, according to Form and Huber, “Believe that politics and government function according to their conception of the democratic ideology which, incidentally, favors them.” Additionally, their undereducated counterparts “See politics and government as favoring other strata”10 because (primarily) they do not understand the “system” as well as others, and (secondary) appear to be reaping disparate rewards for similar efforts – both factions are partly correct in their assumptions. Due to this education gap, and the ensuing political breach, these two groups have aligned with polar political collections – “One that supports the ongoing system as functioning according to theory, and another that is not only suspicious of the theory, but is also dedicated to an alternative interpretation of it.”10

When exactly, and how, does education begin to effect political efficacy? According to Schley Lyons, children attending school begin to gain a sense of political efficacy as early as the third grade.14 White students also “Demonstrate positive and supportive feelings toward the government and political leaders … believe it is important to vote, and are not as politically cynical as adults.”14 Even when confronted with the negative political realities that parents and/or adults complain of, white children are generally unaffected.15 However, this is not true of black students.

Paul Abramson finds that “Black schoolchildren in the United States, like their white counterparts, have virtually no political power. Yet, socialization research suggests that black children feel less politically powerful than white children do. Like white children, black children have little or no experience with which to evaluate the trustworthiness of political leaders, but research suggests that black children are also less likely to trust political leaders than white children are.”16

Abramson offers two separate explanations which shed light on these racial differences. First, he believes that low levels of self-competence are one of the causes for inferior feelings of efficacy. He states that social deprivation, brought about by “Deprived [social] opportunity … denied respect … divorced parents … several siblings … [and/or] low economic levels,” ultimately yield a feeling that their votes (an extension of themselves) are unimportant, politicians do not respect them, and elections are therefore a meaningless process.17 It may be important to note here that low political efficacy, brought about by any of these factors, does not necessarily mean that such individuals view the whole system as unjust. In fact, it is more common for them to see the government as working for most, just not for them. Again, the low sense of self worth demeans efficacy, but does not significantly damage feelings of trust or overall legitimacy.

Abramson’s second explanation revolves around the concept of political reality. He argues that blacks “Have less ability to influence political leaders than whites … have less reason to trust political leaders … [and they] know these facts, or they are indirectly influenced by adults who know these facts.”18 Abramson noted that there are very few black representatives holding national office, and that the small amount that are present, are held back by institutions such as the seniority system in Congress. Also, politicians are more likely to ignore the demands of a minority; especially if that group does not hold a margin large enough to swing an election or make a significant impact within the media.18

Elliott White clarifies what these findings mean for the political future of such youth. She documented decreased social participation in working class schools (compared to middle class schools), junior high schools as contrasted to primary schools, small city schools (marked next to big city ones), and an overall diminutive social involvement corresponding with lowering I.Q.

levels.19 For these students, low degrees of social association were found to be synonymous with low confidence levels; and as Abramson noted, such symptoms contribute to feelings of political inefficacy. White’s message conveyed that, as the child grows under these conditions, future political participation is unlikely.19

Important socioeconomic and educational variances have been well documented in this analysis, but how they relate specifically to different races and genders has not. In the world of minority politics, it is often said that, for example, Nancy Pelosi is a great role model for aspiring female politicians, or in other words, proof that a minority can succeed. Such testimonies supposedly justify the majority rule.

Jennifer Lawless wrote a published report which addressed the issue of low female representation in both houses of Congress. What she found in her studies was that “The presence of women in politics does not seem to affect women’s political trust, efficacy, [or] competence…”21 Such results tend to negate the popular belief that electing a handful of minority spokespersons actually increases feelings of efficacy in the political arena.

What does help however, is the increased political power and resources that come with growing representation in the government. Lawless asserts that this is actually just as important, because it gives a voice to a group that may have otherwise been unheard. In doing so, it forces the people in power to become more responsive to ones that are gaining, or at least amassing significant votes, to listen to their interests. Lawless also brings up numerous studies which show that this phenomenon occurs not only with women, but with African Americans, and any other group finding itself in a similar situation.20

In a previous section of this paper I logged some of the differences between rich people and their counterparts. At this point I would like to make an annotation to show just how this relates to race and efficacy. Although the laws for the upper and lower classes are the same, there still appears to be differences between them that give the poor (mostly minorities) the impression that they are being punished.

For example, America’s history of slavery still causes some to view the system as illegitimate and not worth participating in. The control that wealthy PAC’s seem to possess over legislators also gives minorities cause to question the legitimacy of democracy. A lack of clear minority representation in the government, and the failure of the few “token members” to inspire hope, cause lowered feelings of efficacy. Also, the disproportionally high number of minorities in the prison system (as compared to their population within the country) creates worries of prejudice de facto laws.

Additionally, since many public schools are paid for through local property taxes, and said dues are higher in richer neighborhoods, the affluent tend to have better school systems than the poor. This references my earlier notes on disparities between white and black students’ feelings of political efficacy. Also, since minorities do not account for a large part of the established politicians in Washington, it makes representing their social interests more difficult – especially when considering subjects such as welfare. As Form and Huber put it, “Both the rich and poor are concerned with government welfare policies, the former because the size of the government welfare load adversely affects their taxes and the latter because welfare policies affect daily living. One would expect the rich and the poor, therefore, to differ in their views of welfare politics, for the former consider welfare a cost and the latter, a benefit.”22 The minority reliance on social assistance programs, and the prosperous’ propensity to view such agendas as an expense, rather than a necessary outlay, make representing the non-majority even more difficult.

I am not trying to suggest that minorities are actually politically powerless, just that there are many factors which contribute to explaining why they feel that way. Indeed, young people and minorities, even though their participation in elections is more vital to their representation than other groups, often have the lowest voter turnout rate. This has created a vicious cycle in which minorities are not being accurately represented because they don’t vote, and politicians ignoring them during their campaigns because they worry that stumping for their votes would be a waste of time.

Elizabeth Bennion chronicles a similar situation, which begins by noting that “Between 1960 and 2000 the percentage of Americans going to the polls declined, despite increased educational attainment, decreased legal barriers, and other developments that might lead us to expect an increase in voter turnout.”24 Bennion’s experiment fortifies earlier research which proves that the particular message in a Get Out The Vote (GOTV) campaign is unimportant. The physical presence of another person urging fellow citizens to mobilize themselves to the polls is enough to have a significant effect, regardless of their political biases.23 These methods however, are labor intensive, and consume more time than simple direct mail or mass phone calls, so politicians find them to be less efficient. In the constant effort to garner constituent support with the least amount of effort, the youth vote is often traded in for the more stable, easier targeted elderly vote (or whatever age/race group has the highest turnout rate).23

Although logical, this method of campaigning often leaves out many sects of the society. David Niven also points out that in any given neighborhood, half of the houses canvassed may not respond to the door. Furthermore, as effective as face-to-face representation is with consistent, intermittent, and seldom voters, such dramatic results “Call for something close to a perpetual investment of time and money.”25 Understandably, such GOTV campaigns can be quite demanding, and in some cases, unreasonably so.

Further evidence also suggests that face-to-face GOTV crusades do not increase feelings of efficacy in all subgroups. Melissa Michelson reminds us that from 1980 to 2000, the Latino population in America has more than doubled, and that the Latinos have become our largest minority group. However, Michelson points out, this has yet to increase their political power, namely because their voter turnout rates are far behind that of the general population. She also observes a national-level failure to incorporate Latinos into the political system as they had previous immigrant groups.26

Michelson believes that low feelings of political efficacy in Latinos can be attributed to the “Shift to less personal campaigning over the last 50 years [that] has depressed political participation.”27 Again, because this group is not turning out to vote, they are being ignored by the national parties – a cycle doomed only to repeat itself. Not only are these impersonal methods of campaigning (throngs of television commercials, direct mail, mass calling lists, etc.) causing Latinos, and many other groups, to feel less politically important, but Michelson also reports information that “Only in 1 in 7 Latino men and 1 in 25 Latinas were asked to become politically involved.”28 These facts, combined with the knowledge that door-to-door canvassing significantly increases political efficacy, and that the actual message (partisan or otherwise) appears to be unimportant when increasing turnout, suggest to Michelson that “It is not so much a matter of convincing Latinos that it is important for them to participate but that they need only to be asked.”27

Voting patterns are not the only way to show that an individual possesses high feelings of efficacy. Alford and Scoble have suggested that “Feelings of efficacy result from greater participation, rather than the other way around… The most important element is probably not voting, which is rather widespread, but what is done in addition to voting, namely, making financial contribution and engaging in political action.”1 Similarly, Steven Finkel writes that “What results from voting instead is an increase in external efficacy, the sense that the political authorities are responsive to citizen demands.”31 In other words, political involvement prior to Election Day voting is what actually what influences efficacy – not the tangible process of casting a ballot. Many political scientists believe this to be true, but they disagree on what factors increase efficacy, and in what ways.

Finkel also puts pen to paper that, as a universal note on democracy, “Participation in politics is thought to make the citizen more likely to consider the institutions, norms and values of a given regime morally proper, to promote an increase in satisfaction with the system as whole.”30 Consequently, if one considers the democratic method legitimate, one is exponentially more likely to participate in it. However, different forms of participation result in varying consequences on efficacy.

Not all forms of political participation increase political efficacy. Peaceful demonstrations (marches, strikes, participation in a rally, etc.) for example, exert no enhancing or decreasing effect on efficacy. Aggressive demonstrations (riots, illegal sit-ins on private property, refusal to pay taxes, etc.), on the other hand, result in lowered feelings of political efficacy. It is the more conventional forms of participation (donations to a candidate, door-to-door canvassing, etc.) that appear to increase political efficacy.29 This is somewhat surprising because collectively, the more time, effort, resources, and/or consideration that a person gives to a candidate or campaign, the larger his/her efficacy becomes. However, these results are not haphazard to the broad-spectrum rule because such forms of political participation arise from unique individual situations, and the reaction thereof.29

Political activism can often be used to measure internal efficacy, and vice versa, but how do high and low feelings of internal efficacy initially surface? Watanabe and Milburn analyzed polling data from 1984 to determine if grassroots movements are the source of internal efficacy. Their study examines a time period when the threat of nuclear Armageddon was constantly heard about in the media, and thousands of people were rallying nationally under the flag of world peace and nuclear nonproliferation. The serious prospect of nuclear war and the mutually assured destruction that would likely ensue was expected to cause large amounts of American citizens to become politically active.

What they found was that political participation was dependent upon two factors. First, the individual in question had to be motivated enough (by worry, anxiety, or enthusiasm) to actually get up and do something. Second, motivated characters had to believe that the government would actually respond to their protests – this is the definition of external efficacy.32

To shed more light on the first aspect, emotional concern, I consulted Rudolph and others’ study on the correlation between efficacy, emotion, and campaign involvement. They stated that “Citizens’ political behavior is conditional on their emotional state.… Candidate-induced enthusiasm spurs involvement while candidate-induced anxiety, by itself, does not.”34 In layman’s terms, when a candidate promises to create change, or do something beneficial for a group, the internal efficacy feelings of affected peoples can increase. Adversely, when a candidate uses scare tactics to provoke fear or anxiety, internal efficacy does not increase. It can cause a decrease in the politically inefficacious, but it can also contribute to heightened levels on political involvement among those with already high levels of internal efficacy.33

The second factor that Watanabe and Milburn concluded dictates political involvement, high feelings of external efficacy, can derive from joining an organization, giving money to a cause, writing or calling Congressmen, attending rallies, and being generally involved in a cause. Since their studies chronicled an issue which was potentially life threatening, I would have expected a larger amount of people to become engaged with such activities, but their findings suggested that anti-nuclear involvement primarily occurred within the groups that were already highly efficacious and had previously associated themselves with political activity.32

The next question is what else affects external efficacy? As mentioned in previous parts of this paper, race, income, education, and preceding regimes, are major factors when considering the question of whether or not the government is responsive, but there is one more factor which needs to be calculated into the equation: Trust. This is the belief that the government and its officials are doing the right thing, and will also do what they promise if reelected. This graphic highlights some of the continuing variables involved in calculating trust.

Reference Note 35

Eran Vigoda-Gadot believes that perception of ethics and satisfaction with services share a direct relationship with each other. He further suggests that “Ethics, together with satisfaction with services, are good predictors of attitudes toward the democratic system.… Thus, when citizens perceive the bureaucracy as insensitive, feel that it promotes the interests of powerful individuals or groups based on political considerations, and believe that it engages in unfair practices, public attitudes toward democracy may become more cynical. Similarly, citizens may react negatively … by reducing their levels of trust and confidence in governance… These perceptions may lead to diminished belief in the value of citizens’ involvement or political efficacy, negatively affecting citizens’ willingness to participate in politics.”35

Douglas Madsen adds a caveat to the satisfaction with services sector by claiming that many citizens will attribute causal relation, unjustly, to the national government. In such circumstances, the federal government must only maintain the appearance that everything is stable and functioning well for people to be positively affected.36 For example, if the economy is in better shape today than it was yesterday, it will have a constructive effect with the general population – even though it is highly unlikely that a change in the economy, after one day, can be realistically credited to legislators in Washington.

Philip Pollock III proved in his research that low levels of external efficacy, by itself, does not necessarily mean that participation will not transpire, simply that it will likely manifest in a different form.37 Political efficacy can be equated to a three part program with successive steps: In step one, internal efficacy is acquired; once the individual has this, he/she can move on to gaining a sense of external efficacy; lastly, once internal and external efficacy are present, the individual is highly likely to vote. When external efficacy is missing, the probability of not voting is expected.

These conditions set the stage for what Pollock calls, “nonallegiant” voting. This pattern of behavior is often characterized by strong campaigning efforts, (typically) nonviolent protests, extremist actions (rare, but usually associated with this group), and a very low voter turnout rate. When this group does vote, loyalty to any one specific party is absent.37 In terms of political representation, this collection of voters stands as an autonomous faction (similar to the Independents and other third parties).

Since voting increases external efficacy, and presumably then, confidence in the government, perhaps the most important aspect of trust is keeping cynicism at bay. This is an area in which politicians are almost solely responsible. Bad administrative policies and presidential scandals, as noted earlier, are the apparent cause for cynicism and party abandonment. For example, many political scientists and historians agree that the leaking of the so-called Pentagon Papers in 1971 was the definitive breaking point for Americans when it came to giving the federal government the benefit of the doubt. Such disgraces can rationally only be blamed on the deceit of a handful of politicians, yet the ignominy tarnishes the reputation of the entire national government. Constituent trust can only be earned by proving to the American people that their cynicism is unwarranted, and that we can reasonably trust our elected officials and their appointments.

Perhaps the most important thing to bear in mind when gathering or sharing beliefs on political efficacy is that, as Robert Weissberg puts it, we can not observe these phenomena through the direct lens empirical data.41 He contends that feelings of efficacy and supposed levels of trust in the government are abstract concepts that the average citizen can have no possible way to truthfully gauge. These “golden lies” prompt him to ask “What happens when a large proportion of middle-class people can make accurate estimations about their infinitesimally small impact on most policy – that is, feel inefficacious?”42

In actuality, he is right. A single vote in the general election will account for less than .0001% of the total turnout. Even if the average voter could bring in a hundred additional voters, more friends than they likely know, it would not make a statistical difference. Clearly an overinflated ego is necessary to participate in politics, for without one, feelings of both internal and external efficacy would be completely deflated.

Another article of information that should be remembered when analyzing mine, and other researchers’ findings regarding political efficacy, is Scott Ainsworth’s critique that most efficacy studies are done at the individual micro level, excluding macro events.43 Undoubtedly, some macro level incidents are bound to impact feelings of efficacy, such as an ongoing war in a foreign country, or a mounting national deficit.

Some of Ainsworth’s experimental data also suggests that conscientious nonvoters, although obviously not participating in casting a ballot, (thus removing their sense of external efficacy) can still manifest positive feelings of internal efficacy. Such results occurred because the individual was able to correctly predict the outcome of an election, which self-verified their feelings that they are competent enough to participate in politics, and have simply chosen not to do so at this time.43

Ainsworth’s most important contribution though, is his conceptualization of how political efficacy and participation are related. He wrote that “Although the enrichment of an individual’s sense of political efficacy is deemed to be a product of participation, the participation itself is seldom considered instrumental. That is, participation is deemed to enhance political efficacy through rewarding learning processes, regardless of the end results of the participation.”44

The actual process of voting not only increases external efficacy, but also serves as a glorified receipt, reminding yourself that you have participated in one of America’s most important expressions of liberty while others have not. This knowledge that you are part of the solution increases self-confidence and lays the groundwork for future participation. Utilizing such rights and intellectually contributing were the foundation of this country.

Throughout democracy’s long history, there have been two constant questions: Who should vote, and how? Americans have decided that a representative democracy with checks and balances is the fairest and most legitimate way for the majority to govern itself, as well as the minority. We have taken steps such as passing the National Voter Registration Act, the Help America Vote Act, and enacting laws to protect universal suffrage, to ensure that everybody is spoken for.

Obviously, participation in the electoral process is critical to the perseverance of a representative democracy. So then, is discovering the ultimate cause for this current lack of involvement. My goal in compiling this research was to separate the many pseudo-factors which affect efficacy, and establish a listing of the major legitimate ones. In doing so, future investigations can focus on finding solutions to our low voter turnout rate. My findings all note well documented issues concerning low political efficacy in America, and the next step is using these answers to keep our democracy alive.


Notes

1. Alan Abramowitz, David Lanoue, and Subha Ramesh, “Economic Conditions, Causal Attributions, and Political Evaluations in the 1984 Presidential Election,” The Journal of Politics Vol. 50, No. 4 (Nov., 1988): 848-863, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2131382.

2. Krysha Gregorowicz, Eric W. Groenendyk, and Nicholas A. Valentino, “Emotions, Efficacy, and Political Participation,” Center for Political Studies at University of Michigan, http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/0/4/7/6/pages204768/p204768-1.php.

3. Ronald D. Lambert, James E. Curtis, Steven D. Brown, and Barry J. Kay, “Effects of Identification with Governing Parties on Feelings of Political Efficacy and Trust,” Canadian Journal of Political Science Vol. 19, No. 4 (Dec., 1986): 705-728, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3227797.

4. Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View From the States, (New York, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1972), 130, Quoted in Russell Hanson, Political Culture, Interparty Competition and Political Efficacy in the American States, (Oxford University Press, 1980): 18.

5. Elazar, American Federalism, 20.

6. Russell Hanson, “Political Culture, Interparty Competition and Political Efficacy in the American States,” Publius Vol. 10, No. 2 (Spring, 1980): 17-36, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3329721.

7. Hanson, Political Culture, 21.

8. William H. Form and Joan Huber, “Income, Race, and the Ideology of Political Efficacy,” The Journal of Politics Vol. 33, No. 3 (Aug. 1971): 659-688, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2128277.

9. Form and Huber, The Journal of Politics, 661.

10. Form and Huber, The Journal of Politics, 662-663.

11. Robert Heilbroner, The Making of Economic Society, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1962), 27, Paraphrased in Form and Huber, Income, Race, and the Ideology of Political Efficacy, (Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science Association, 1971): 664.

12. Alford and Scoble, Local Political Involvement, 1,206, Quoted in Form and Huber, The Journal of Politics, 670.

13. Form and Huber, The Journal of Politics, 674.

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15. Lyons, The Journal of Politics, 289.

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17. Abramson, The Journal of Politics, 1249-1252.

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22. Form and Huber, The Journal of Politics, 676.

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24. Bennion, Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, 125.

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27. Michelson, Political Behavior, 258-259.

28. Michelson, Political Behavior, 249.

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30. Finkel, The Journal of Politics, 443.

31. Finkel, The Journal of Politics, 444.

32. Paul Y. Watanabe and Michael A. Milburn, “Activism against Armageddon: Some Predictors of Nuclear-Related Political Behavior,” Political Psychology Vol. 9, No. 3 (Sep. 1988): 459-470, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791725.

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34. Rudolph, Gangl, and Stevens, The Journal of Politics, 1196.

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39. Wattenberg, Presidential Studies Quarterly, 166-169.

40. Kenneth Winneg and Kathleen H. Jamieson, “’Elections’: Party Identification in the 2004 Election,” Presidential Studies Quarterly Vol. 35, No. 3, Unilateral Powers (Sep. 2005): 576-589, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27552706.

41. Robert Weissberg, “Political Efficacy and Political Illusion,” The Journal of Politics Vol. 37, No. 2 (May 1975): 469-487, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2129003.

42. Weissberg, The Journal of Politics, 487.

43. Scott H. Ainsworth, “Modeling Political Efficacy and Interest Group Membership,” Political Behavior, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun. 2000): 89-108, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1520065.

44. Ainsworth, Political Behavior, 104.

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