National Voter Registration Act 1993, aka Motor Voter Law, Has it Failed

The National Voter Registration Act of 1993

Has the Motor Voter Law Failed

Texas State University POSI 4336

Introduction

Throughout Democracy’s long, extravagant, and sometimes rebellious history, one question has remained the same: Who should vote and how? In this research based analysis I will attempt to answer just one caveat in the American form of democracy. By the addition of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, has the standard United States citizen been affected positively or negatively?

The answer is important because a positive effect means that voter registration (and likely turnout) rates should have increased since 1993, and by enacting such a law, democracy has been protected. However, if the “Motor Voter” Act has negatively impacted democratic rule, then the United States legislatures should immediately repeal it in the collective interests of its people. Regardless of any personal bias, a clear response is needed to make an informed evaluation of the overall political situation in America.

Sources and Review of the Information Used

In any research based study, the data collector will find him/herself in a position to influence readers with his/her own biases. In this section I hope to lay to rest any fears of favoritism by outlining my sources and making note of any prejudices that I detect. In doing so, I believe that I am giving the reader every possible opportunity to decide for themselves if what I am writing (or quoting) is merely propaganda, or an educated opinion.

1 Executive Summary of the Federal Election Commission Report to the Congress on the Impact of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993. Primary source. This is the official Federal Election Commission’s evaluation of the Motor Voter Act. It was prepared 4 years after the Act was implemented, and contains thorough statistics on many related subjects.

2 The Star-Ledger’s article entitled New Jersey to Push More Registrations Through “Motor Voter” Bill. Secondary source. This reports the findings of the New Jersey’s Special Advocate concerning failures of DMVs to enforce the Motor Voter bill.

3 Political Behavior, Vol. 20, No. 2, is a primary source which analyses direct National Election Study data to determine the effectiveness of the Motor Voter law.

4 The Journal of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 3, is a primary source which uses state-level data to determine if Motor Voter is working.

5 Political Science and Politics, Vol. 32, No. 2, is a secondary source which attempts to answer the question of “Why was voter turnout exceptionally low, and registration levels remarkably high, in the 1996 election?”

6 Public Choice, Vol. 103, No. 1/2, is a mixed source. Some of the data has been collected personally through surveys, and then compiled with existing data, for the purpose of stating conclusively if juror selection is a deterrent to voter registration.

7 The National Center for Policy Analysis is a partisan organization. However, for this article they used data collected by the Wall Street Journal to affirm the facts surrounding certain voter fraud situations.

8 The New York Times’s article is a secondary source editorial which aims to show some of the more drastic failings of the Motor Voter law in recent times, and accuses George W. Bush for chiefly responsible for many shortcomings.

9 The Motor Voter Act and Voter Fraud is a primary source statement read to a Congressional Committee concerning the monetary and iconic failure that Samples believes defines the Motor Voter law.

10 About the National Voter Registration Act is the primary source of law on Motor Voter. It is a government maintained website which contains all the statutes and sections of the National Voter Registration Act.

11 Fox News’s article is a primary source which follows the story of Mabel Briscoe, who successfully registered her dog to vote in the state of Maryland.

12 Political Science and Politics, Vol. 34, No. 1, is a secondary source which measures the differences between different registering stations and their affects on different classes and races.

Analysis of Information

The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), or “Motor Voter Law,” was passed in 1993. The bill intended to increase voter registration with four major parts. First, by creating a semi-automatic method of registration at the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). When applying for a license, or renewing an old one, an option is presented by the clerk to be automatically registered to vote. Second, the government agencies that distribute benefits such as unemployment checks and food stamps are required to also offer information on registration. Third, one section of the NVRA was dedicated to providing registration information in many different minority languages. Fourth, by creating strict guidelines for the removal of previous registrants from the voting roster.

According to the voting record held by the United States Senate (1993), the NVRA passed with 62 yeas, 36 nays, and 2 abstaining (1 Democrat and 1 Republican). Of the 62 yeas, 59 were Democrats. And of the 35 nays, all were Republicans (Untied States Senate, 1993). It can be clearly stated that since every Republican opposed the Motor Voter Law, that there would have been heavy arguments in the House. Additionally, since it passed with only 3 Republicans on board with the program, it is apparent that the debate did little to gain favor with politicians across party lines.

A similar result is seen the other House of Congress. The Office of the Clerk (1993) notes that the NVRA passed in the House of Representatives with 259 ayes (238 Democrat,) and 164 noes (150 Republican) (Office of the Clerk, 1993). Again the Democrats are able to shove the resolution through, not by working with the GOP, but by their sheer numbers.

In theory, the long-term political ramifications on support of a passed resolution should measure the same in both parties, since the bill has in fact already been approved. However, I theorize that because this law was adopted not by consent, but against the wishes of almost all Republicans in Congress, this will have a hidden negative impact on the bill. While I have not found any articles that discuss this issue, I believe the reader should consider this when attributing blame or credit to a piece of national legislation.

The question of whether or not the Motor Voter Law has helped differs from asking if the NVRA has been overall successful. Stephen Knack (1995) contends that, “In contrast to motor voter, other provisions required by the NVRA—including mail-in and agency-based registration, and limitations on the purging of voter polls—show little evidence of effectiveness in the states where they have already been implemented” (p. 798).

Enforcement of Motor Voter is a difficult task. Jason Fink (2008) reports that, “Just 11 percent of new voters in New Jersey registered at a motor vehicle agency. … The state is falling in line after the state Public Advocate found New Jersey was barely complying last year. A February 2007 study found only eight percent of people leaving motor vehicle agencies in the state had been offered the chance to register as voters” (Fink, 2008). He also notes that people acquiring a new license are not being handed registration forms, drivers seeking a change of address are not being updated on the voter list, and that registration signs are not easily visible (Fink, 2008).

In a study by Highton and Wolfinger (1998), they find that NVRA enforcement of DMV registration is different from the previous methods of implementation. Once the state had adopted the federal mandate, registration increased by four percentage points (4.7 - 8.7) – a miniscule amount compared to the NVRA’s predicted effect. Additionally, they find that the new purging system will increase turnout (as a proportion to registered voters) by only 2%; and the order to coordinate a “universal mailing system” has no effect (p. 81).

The Federal Election Commission (FEC) works to administer election campaign statutes. It provides an executive summary to Congress concerning all federally effected voting laws. In 1997 they submitted that “States reported a total of 142,995,856 registered voters nationwide for 1996, amounting to 72.77 % of the Voting Age Population (VAP). This is the highest percentage of voter registration since reliable records were first available in 1960. The report also notes that the number of Americans actually voting in 1996 declined by over 5 percentage points from 1992 -- the first presidential election since 1972, when the franchise was extended to 18-21 year olds, that voter registration rose while turnout declined” (FEC, 1997).

While the registration numbers are impressive, Knack (1999) articulated some very contradictory questions. Why did “Turnout drop in every state between 1992 and 1996[?] … [Why has] the most dramatic liberalization of voter registration procedures in American history coincided with not only the lowest level of turnout since 1924, but with the largest single four-year decline since 1920[?] … The theory that registration barriers are the chief cause of the gap … suffered a devastating blow, as turnout in North Dakota—where voters aren’t even required to register—was a mere 56% of the voting population in 1996” (p. 239).

John Samples, Director of the Center for Responsible Government at the Cato Institute, standing before the United States Senate Committee on Rules and Administration (2001), testified about the concrete and representational damage caused by Motor Voter. He said that the Act “Considerably complicated the states' task of keeping the registration rolls clean. … To remove a voter who has moved … the local jurisdiction … [must] get written confirmation of the move from the citizen … [or] send a notice to the voter … The cost of these mailings is significant. In Indiana … such a mailing would have a price tag of about $2 million … twice the Election Division's entire annual budget. Given … the limited resources of most local election boards, we should not be surprised that the registration rolls throughout the nation are enormously inaccurate. Some counties … report … voting roll numbers are bigger than the voting-age population. … The clogged rolls have cost taxpayers thousands of dollars in cleanup costs and additional election expenses. For example, the Indiana Election Division has conducted its statewide duplicate program four times at a total cost of about $900,000. Officials in Indiana have increased the number of voting sites unnecessarily because the lists are so inaccurate. … Each new precinct costs county taxpayers $10,000 for two voting machines and about $500 per election for additional poll workers and supplies. Statewide in Indiana, more than 200 precincts have been added since the law went into effect … the state gets nothing in return for such spending. Such costs for the nation as a whole must be large” (Samples, 2001).

Samples continues by pointing out that in Indiana alone, “Tens of thousands of people appear on the voter rolls more than once, that more than 300 dead people were registered, and that three convicted killers and two convicted child molesters were on the rolls. In general, experts believe one in five names on the rolls in Indiana do not belong there.” Moreover, “Georgia found more than 15,000 dead people on active voting rolls,” and “Alaska [1998]… had [65,968 more registries than there were] … people of voting age were living in the state that year. Similar studies in other states would no doubt return similar data. … The inflation of the registration rolls has also clearly misled Americans about the state of their democracy. Inflated and inaccurate rolls give a false measure of voting turnout as a proportion of registered voters. … Political scientists have charted the decline in trust in government over the past four decades … ‘Motor Voter’ has been part of that problem, not part of its solution” (Samples, 2001).

The National Center for Policy Analysis (2001) elaborates on the potential for fraud in the system, stating “It's much easier to vote today if you are dead or don't exist than it was before 1993.” Due to the fact that there are over 8 million people registering with license applications, but only 5% actually voting, there is clearly an abundant supply of eligible names to steal. A lack of I.D. requirement for any type of voting only complicates matters further (NCPA, 2001).

Kathleen Wereszynski (2001), a reporter for Fox News, finds a similar hole in Motor Voter. When 82-year-old Mabel Briscoe’s 3-year-old dog received a notice for jury duty in Maryland, Ms. Briscoe contacted her Country Board of Elections. Wereszynksi reports “[Briscoe believed] Motor Voter makes it possible for just about anyone, from non-U.S. citizens, those under 18 years of age, and criminals, to register. To test her suspicion, she attempted to register her dog Holly through the Motor Voter program two years ago. … The Calvert County Board of Elections received Holly’s registration application by mail on July 2, 1999, according to registrar Charlene Sparrow. ‘In the state of Maryland, identification is not required, just the sworn signature,’ Sparrow told Fox News. … But when a Maryland resident is registered to vote, his or her name becomes available to the court system for the jury pool” (Wereszynski, 2001). Needless to say, if an 82-year-old woman can fool the Board of Elections, suspicions of voter registration fraud, and the election fraud it generally entails, are absolutely warranted.

The rare canine summons is not the only problem Motor Voter poses concerning jury duty. In a study by Knack (2000) using survey and additional data sources, he “Confirms the finding that the use of voter registration lists for jury selection purposes significantly reduces registration rates.” His study also proves that “A large percentage of Americans are aware that voter registration lists are the primary source lists for selection of jurors” (p. 50). Registering to vote quickly and easily at first appeared to have no downsides, but once registrants are aware that a potentially time consuming (and generally considered arduous) task may await, one would expect a decrease in registrations and re-enrollment.

Conclusion

Although many points of view have been analyzed during the course of this review, I believe that one voice stands out far above any other. All of my research clearly demonstrates that the NVRA has been only minimally successful, and that the monetary and symbolic costs of this burdensome system have outweighed the benefits. Motor Voter has increased expenditures, the likelihood of fraud, and is beat on every level by methods such as direct registration at polls.

One reason for this might be the lack of Republican support. Locally elected politicians have much more unsupervised power than our federal appointments. This would help explain some of the differences in the Motor Voter Law’s varying effect in each state. Allegations of DMV failures to distribute the proper paperwork for example, would be first reported on the local level. If a Republican is handed a complaint about such an issue, it is conceivable that he could write it off on the “large federal government,” and nothing more would become of the matter.

Also, each individual Secretary of State is allowed to deny voter registration applications as he/she sees fit. In which case, unless the victims have the time and resources to file a lawsuit against the state, the Secretary’s ruling will stand. Again, it is plausible that a Republican who does not support the NVRA (of which there are many,) would be able to freely reject applications from the new registration sites. The overall effect being an apparent failure of the Motor Voter Law due to superficial statistics which would show little to no increase in the number of voter registrants from newly approved NVRA locations.

The bill may also have been compromised because 6 states were exempt from the NVRA due to differences in state registration methods. Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Wyoming, and Wisconsin, did not have to follow any provision of the NVRA because they either had direct registration at the polling locations, or required no registration at all (Department of Justice, 2008).

Arguments posted by individual states concerning the constitutionality of the NVRA may also have contributed to the Motor Voter Law’s perceived failure. Even states held by Democrats contested this bill. Within the first month of the law’s enactment, California, Illinois, Michigan, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, New York, South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia, were all sued by the federal government because of a failure to comply with the law. They believed that the legislation was unconstitutional (Department of Justice, 2008).

Unpopular and demanding statutes have also been the cause for 110 additional federal cases concerning the NVRA. Almost every state has been found to be in violation of some part of the law since 1993 (Department of Justice, 2008). With so many cases being filed, it is clear that there are multiple issues within the Motor Voter Law that make it excessively difficult for states to follow. This, combined with the low number of new voting registrants since 1993, who register within the DMV or through the newly appointed NVRA sites, lend much credibility to the argument that the Motor Voter Law has failed on multiple levels.

The question was also raised on whether or not we can trust data collected from the DMV as reliable. As Knack points out, since a drivers license must only be renewed, on average, every 6 years (or more depending on the state), it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of the Motor Voter Law. If we rely only on the attainment of new and re-enrolled registrants at the DMV as the indicator of success, then we can expect to only see results every several years. From a statistical perspective, the NVRA would appear to have failed, since the percentage of registrants will be spread out over a time span of years, causing a deceptively low proportional increase (Knack, 1995).

Another problem with Motor Voter occurred during its original conception. The NVRA was designed to ultimately increase voter turnout, specifically in national elections. The basic rationale being that registered voters will participate in the electoral process. However, political scientists find that voter turnout is separate, and sometimes independent, from registration. I believe this occurs because of two primary reasons.

1 Jury selection and other nonelectoral uses of registrant data. Obviously, any potential registrant wanting to avoid jury duty (more than they want to vote,) will decline even the simplest registration options. This number, according to Knack (2000) is very large.

2 Failure to promote interest. The real problem with Motor Voter is that fails to address the main cause of low voter turnout: Dwindling feelings of political efficacy.

Wolfinger and Hoffman concluded that “One explanation for this disappointment [in voter turnout] is the common observation that people for whom registration is costless are unlikely to exert themselves to vote.” (p. 2). Political efficacy is the greatest determinant in likelihood to voting, and is clearly not being upshot by higher registration rates.

Even the one seemingly real advancement in upping voter registration coming directly after the NVRA was implemented into law is suspicious. Prior to the NVRA, states would purge their registration lists of people who did not vote in the last general election, or those who had moved within the state. Reinstatement of such a large number of individuals would make the NVRA appear (falsely) to be immediately effective (Knack, 1995). Thus the huge increase in initial voter registration may simply be attributed to the states re-enrollment of wrongfully removed voters.

Figure 1, Samples (2001) illustrates that although registration increases, turnout does not.

I don’t believe that fraud (or the fear of it swinging elections) is a major contributor to the overall low turnout rate in America. Since low turnout was a problem before the NVRA, and levels fluctuated previous to proof of fraudulent voting surfacing, it can be fairly ruled out as a major contributor to low election attendance. However, increased fraud due to requirements of the Motor Voter Law, do enhance the bill’s reputation as an overall disappointment.

The problems with the DMVs in New Jersey do raise a comprehensive concern. Had the New Jersey Public Advocate not been investigating, it is unlikely that any such DMV failures would have been reported. Considering that New York and New Jersey are the only states with such an entity, it elevates anxiety that DMVs around the country are not up to snuff on NVRA requirements. Yet again, Motor Voter disappoints by overlooking such provisions.

Unfortunately, the incidents at numerous New Jersey DMVs are not isolated to that state alone. Similar problems are being reported at multiple federal assistance sites. According to The New York Times (2009), “In a 2005 study of 103 people leaving a Department of Jobs and Family Services office in Ohio, only three reported being given voter registration forms. Surveys conducted outside of public assistance offices in Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Maryland and other states found similar problems … the motor voter law is proving to be far less effective in registering voters than it should be. According to the report by Project Vote and Demos, the number of people registering from public assistance agencies fell 79 percent between 1995 and 1996 … and 2005 and 2006, the most recent reporting period.” In the same article, Senator Schumer (D – NY) specifically blames George W. Bush, stating that “For eight years, the Bush Justice Department showed little interest in enforcing the law” (New York Times, 2009).

References

Federal Election Commission. (1997). Executive Summary of the Federal Election Commission Report to the Congress on the Impact of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993. Retrieved from http://www.fec.gov/votregis/nvrasum.htm

Fink, J. (2008). New Jersey to Push More Registrations Through 'Motor Voter' Bill. The Star-Ledger. Retrieved from http://www.nj.com/hudson/index.ssf/2008/03/new_jersey_to_push_more_regist.html

Highton, B., & Wolfinger R. E. (1998). Estimating the Effects of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993. Political Behavior, Vol. 20, No. 2, 79-104. Retrieved November 15, 2009, from JSTOR database.

Knack, S. (1995). Does “Motor Voter” Work? Evidence from State-Level Data. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 3, 796-811. Retrieved November 15, 2009, from JSTOR database.

Knack, S. (1999). Drivers Wanted: Motor Voter and the Election of 1996. Political Science and Politics, Vol. 32, No. 2, 237-243. Retrieved November 15, 2009, from JSTOR database.

Knack, S. (2001). Deterring Voter Registration through Juror Selection Practices: Evidence from Survey Data. Public Choice, Vol. 103, No. 1/2, 49-62. Retrieved November 15, 2009, from JSTOR database.

National Center for Policy Analysis, The. (2001). “Motor Voter” Law Has Encourage Ballot Fraud. Editorial. Retrieved from http://www.ncpa.org/sub/dpd/index.php?Article_ID=7397

New York Times, The. (2009). Reviving the Motor Voter Law. Editorial. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/11/opinion/11sat4.html?_r=1

Samples, J. (2001). The Motor Voter Act and Voter Fraud. Washington, DC: The Cato Institute.

United States Department of Justice. (2008). Civil Rights Division. About the National Voter Registration Act. Retrieved November 15, 2009, from http://www.justice.gov/crt/voting/nvra/activ_nvra.php

United States Senate. (May 1993). Legislation and Records. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 103^rd Congress - 1^st Session. Retrieved November 15, 2009, from http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=103&session=1&vote=00118#top

Office of the Clerk U.S. House of Representatives. (May 1993.) Art and History. 72^nd Congress, 103^rd, 1^st Session (1993) Final Vote Results for Roll Call 154. Retrieved November 15, 2009, from http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1993/roll154.xml

Wereszynski, K. (2001). Stunt Reveals Holes in “Motor Voter” Law. Fox News. Retrieved from http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,27281,00.html

Wolfinger, R. E., & Hoffman, J. (2001). Registering and Voting with Motor Voter. Political Science and Politics, Vol. 34, No. 1, 85-92. Retrieved November 15, 2009, from JSTOR database.